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Abstract
We use laboratory experiments to evaluate the effects of cognitive stress on inventory
management decisions in a finite horizon Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model. We
manipulate two sources of cognitive stress. First, we vary participants’ participation in
a competing pin memorization. This exogenously increases cognitive load. Second, we
introduce an intervention to reduce cognitive stress by remove participants’ abilities to
order inventory to only when inventory is depleted. This intervention restricts the policy
choice set. Participants complete a sequence of five “annual” inventory management tasks,
with monthly ordering decisions. Increases in cognitive load negatively impact earnings
with and without the intervention, with the bulk of these impacts occurring in the first
year. Participants’ choices in all treatments trend to near optimal policy adoption. But
only in the intervention and low cognitive load treatment do the majority of choices reach
the optimal policy. We estimate the learning dynamics of monthly order decisions using a
Markov switching model. Estimates suggest increased cognitive load reduces the probability
of switching to more profitable policies, and that in the absence of intervention there is
greater policy lock-in. Our results suggests that higher levels of multi-tasking leads to lower
initial performance when taking on the inventory management of new product lines, and
that the benefits of providing support and task simplicity is greatest when the task is first
assigned.
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1 Introduction
Best inventory management practices call for the solution of dynamic optimization problems.
This requires inventory managers to parse complex sets of alternative solutions and to use their
short-term memory to hold and process information about the past, present, and future values
of key variables. Current workplace trends impose increasing demands upon these managers’
cognitive resources (Ruderman et al., 2017). Some examples of these trends are increasing
complexity of supply chains (Bode and Wagner, 2015), and widely accepted increasing rates
and scale of natural disasters and global social upheavals. We assess how increasing cognitive
stress through the introduction of an additional tasks impacts decision-making quality, and how
a strategic intervention can mitigate the impact of this stress.
EOQ is one of most commonly used inventory management models, particularly in the wholesale
distribution of durable goods. We interviewed inventory managers from four large firms based
in either Guangdong or Jiangsu provinces of China. These firms produce goods such as furni-
ture, clothing and household hardware. These managers reported they, and other managers in
their respective industries, are typically responsible for managing multiple product lines. They
uniformly reported that a major source of performance pressure comes from the common as-
signment of new product lines. We speculate these pressures tax their cognitive resources as
they need to process rates of demand, ordering time frames, holding costs, and et cetera.
The widespread adoption of Economic Resource Planning (ERP) software has partially allevi-
ated this cognitive stress through EOQ expert decision support modules. During our interviews,
the managers noted that the ERP system is the predominant tool used to support their multiple
product line management. These modules automate the tracking of inventories and sales, as well
as recommend order timing and size based upom EOQ solutions. However, they also noted that
they retain, and often exercise, the ability to deviate from the system’s recommendations. They
were most likely to adjust their module inputs or override ordering recommendations during
new product launches or fluctuating performance. While this human discretion allows the indi-
rect incorporation of valuable subjective information, associated human biases and judgement
errors also create potential inefficiencies.
An extensive literature shows that, even under the best of circumstances, individuals systemat-
ically make suboptimal inventory management decisions. Decision-making biases and strategic
considerations are often key factors diminishing individual performances in these tasks (Niran-
jan et al., 2011). When managing the inventory of a perishable good with uncertain demand,
i.e. the newsvendor problem, decision makers neither follow the optimal risk neutral or averse
policies consistently in experimental studies.1 When there is a multi-level supply chain for a
non-perishable good and certain demand, participants generate large bullwhip effects in beer
game experiments. Research have shown key factors driving the excessive inventory levels and
variance include strategic uncertainty regarding other decision makers (Croson et al., 2014),
limited level two thinking (Narayanan and Moritz, 2015) and failure to fully take account of
the future deliveries of past orders. In the setting of a durable good with uncertain demand
1See Katok et al. (2011) for an introduction and partial survey of this literature.
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optimal inventory management follows the (S, s) policy. Recent experimental studies by (Mag-
nani et al., 2016; Khaw et al., 2017) demonstrate that individuals take time to find the optimal
policy, their policy adaptations are idiosyncratic and often participants abandon the optimal
policy once found. Despite all being important inventory management environments, none are
ideal to begin an evaluation of how cognitive stress diminishes decision-making quality. The
reason being decision makers’ performances are already suboptimal in their respective most
favourable experimental conditions.
A more suitable inventory management environment should have two properties: the optimal
policy is invariant to a decision maker’s individual preferences and the majority of decision
makers can find the optimal policy after repetitions. The finite horizon deterministic EOQ
environment potentially possesses these properties. Despite being one of the most commonly
used models in operations management, behavioral studies have mostly overlooked it. We choose
the parameters of our environment such that the optimal inventory policy of the finite horizon
matches that of the infinite horizon; when inventory is depleted, the manager orders an optimal
quantity that is the multiple of the monthly demand for the good (Schwarz, 1972). We refer to
this multiple as an EOQ cycle length. This EOQ environment has several favourable features for
our research question: participants have a relatively good chance of finding the optimal policy;
the solution is invariant to a decision maker’s risk attitude; and, it is an individual decision
problem absent of strategic considerations.
The EOQ solution in our environment is dynamic, as the manager doesn’t make the same
decision at each point in time. This gives us an opportunity to observe pure learning behaviour
in a dynamic problem. In most behavioral supply chain studies, participants do not determine
when to act. In our “Unrestricted” treatment, participants can order additional inventory each
month regardless of the current inventory level. Our intervention, the “Zero Only” treatment,
removes the possibility of violating the optimal inventory policy by forbidding participants from
ordering when there is a positive level of inventory. The other aspect of our experimental design
is the presence of an additional task competing for the participants’ short term memory resources
- we call this our “High” treatment. Our “Low” treatment doesn’t involve this competing task.
The crossing of the intervention treatments and cognitive load treatments constitute our 2× 2
experimental design.
There is an a priori belief that our intervention will yield economically significant improvements.
A growing and recent literature in economics, e.g., Caplin et al. (2011); Masatlioglu et al. (2012);
Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015); Lleras et al. (2017), examines and measures how individual choices are
increasingly suboptimal as their choice sets increase in complexity. Our Unrestricted treatment
corresponds to the case of an unsupported inventory manager while the simplified choice set
of the Zero Only treatment corresponds to active management intervention. This allows our
experiment to provide evidence on the value of this practice.
The second factor we investigate is the presence of a concurrent task that competes for the
inventory manager’s cognitive resources. Tokar et al. (2012) found experimental evidence of
cognitive overload with an increased quantity of information. In practice this would involve
the introduction of inventory management responsibilities of additional product lines. How-
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ever, managing the inventory of an additional product line typically introduces cross-demand
impacts and potential synergies for inventory costs reductions. To control for the “costs” and
“benefits” for successfully inventory management we introduce an additional task unrelated to
the inventory management one.
This concurrent task is the memorization of a PIN code at the beginning of each inventory year,
and successful recall at the end of the year earns a monetary reward. The PIN task was first
introduced by Miller (1956), and has been successively used in economics and psychology to
exogenously shock cognitive load. Some recent examples of its application are in food choice
(Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999), generosity (Roch et al., 2000) and intertemporal choice (Hinson
et al., 2003). Deck and Jahedi (2015) surveys the use of PIN task in economic experiments with
financial incentives as well as reporting new experiments. One of these examines the impact on
the ability to solve mathematical problems and finds increasing PIN length reduces individual
numeracy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use this technique in behavioral
operations management. Correspondingly this allows our experiment to evaluate the impact of
asking inventory managers to multi-task.
Our results show that experimental participants earn less when there is a competing task or
when the intervention is absent. We observe there is a trend that participants learned to adopt
near optimal EOQ policies in general. The restriction of managers to only place orders when
inventories are exhausted and the alleviation of the competing task improved the chance for
decision makers to reach the optimal inventory policy. It should be noted that these performance
differences and suboptimal choices largely occur in the first three iterations of our environment.
Our experimental design allows us to test the popular notion that women are better at multi-
tasking than men, which we do not find in our inventory management context.
As performance improves rapidly across treatments, we attempt to characterize the individual-
level learning driving this trend. We formulate the learning process as a decision tree which
permits hierarchies of sophistication. At the first branch we model the propensity to follow the
basic characteristics of EOQ solutions: avoiding stock-outs or carrying excess inventories. We
find that iterations of the task quickly diminish the probability of making such choices and,
surprisingly, imposing high cognitive loads doesn’t affect these probabilities. Once participants
follow the branch to take EOQ types of actions we model the number of monthly demand orders
requested, the EOQ cycle length, using a Markov switching model (Shachat and Zhang, 2017)
that is particularly well suited for choice sequences made with low levels of rationality. Our
estimates of the model suggest that under high cognitive load participants are less likely to
choose EOQ cycle lengths that increase payoffs. The estimates also suggest that with the more
complicated policy choice sets of the Unrestricted treatment participants are more reluctant to
make large changes in EOQ cycle length leading to greater policy lock-in.
We have found limited other experimental research examining behaviour in EOQ environments.
Shachat et al. (2019), building upon the framework we introduce here, examine individual differ-
ences in a stationary limited horizon EOQ setting. They find participants with higher cognitive
ability tend to choose more effective inventory management policies. However, the performance
gap is transitory as participants with lower cognitive ability exhibit faster learning. We found
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two previous behavioral studies that examine infinite horizon EOQ environments. The EOQ is
one of the three environments Stangl and Thonemann (2017) consider in their behavioral study
of inventory decision-making under two common alternative frames of performance measure-
ment: inventory turnover and the number of days of inventory held. The former leads managers
to over-value inventory reductions relative to the latter. Chen and Wu (2017) examine learning
in an infinite EOQ environment in which there is varying inventory ordering and holding costs.
The experiment consists of fifty rounds of such inventory decisions. For the first fifteen rounds
operational costs were constant, and they varied during the last thirty-five rounds. Their result
shows that learning occurs over rounds, and participants learn much faster about the optimal
choice under stable environment than under changing environment. Suboptimal decisions tend
not to be repeated with deterministic feedbacks. It is important to note that their participants’
choice sets are even more restricted than those of our Zero Only treatment. Participants are
required to choose from an EOQ restricted choice set whose elements are the number of weeks,
their periodicity of demand, of inventory ordered each time inventory is depleted. Thus, their
policy choice set consists only of EOQ policies with fixed EOQ cycle lengths. The feedback
Chen and Wu (2017) provide participants is the average operational costs generated per week
by their EOQ cycle length choice, and participants’ reward metrics are the sum of their average
weekly performances. While we provide a monthly reported feedback on each decision made,
participants experience and collect rewards on a month-to-month basis, which will vary from
months when inventory is ordered to those when it is not.
2 Experiment
2.1 Inventory decision task
In the core decision-making part of our experiment, participants complete a series of six discrete
dynamic inventory management tasks.2 We refer to each tasks as a year, indexed zero to five,
and each year consists of twelve months, indexed by t. We use the following context to describe
these tasks to a participant.
The participant manages the enterprise ‘S-store’ which sells coffee makers with a constant
demand rate (D) of 10 units per month. S-store sells a new model of coffee makers every year.
Coffee maker orders are placed prior to the start of a month, an integer amount denoted qt, and
arrive without lag, hence are included in the calculation of a month’s opening inventory. The
participant chooses the quantity of each monthly order.
Monthly orders and demand determine the changing inventory levels. Let It denote the closing
inventory for month t. The initial inventory of coffee makers prior to month one is zero, so
the first month’s opening inventory is the amount of the first month’s coffee maker order, i.e.
I0 + q1 = q1. In general, the opening inventory of coffee makers in month t is It−1 + qt.
This inventory is drawn down by the monthly sales, the lesser of the monthly order flow of
10 or the opening inventory (i.e. a stockout). This results in the closing inventory of It =
2We use the same inventory management decision problem as Shachat et al. (2019) but with different values
for demand, ordering cost and holding cost.
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It−1 + qt−min{10, It−1 + qt}. When the model life cycle concludes at the end of month 12, any
remaining inventory is disposed at no cost nor generates but also generates no revenue. Further,
we limit a participant’s monthly order by its annual demand, i.e., qt ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 120}.
A participant’s compensation, excluding a fixed show-up fee, is proportional to S-store’s profits,
which are expressed - as are all further monetary quantities - in experiment currency units
(denoted ). Each coffee maker sells at a price of 7. So revenue in month t is 7 ·min{10, It−1+
qt}. S-store’s cost has two component’s: a fixed ordering cost, S, of 45 whenever she places
a strictly positive order; and a constant per-unit monthly inventory holding cost. The monthly
inventory holding costs is calculated by multiplying the average inventory of coffee makers held
in t, specifically (It−1+qt+It)2 , and the monthly holding cost, h, of 1 per unit. The monthly
profit of S-store is the difference between the revenue and costs, and is calculated
pit(qt, It−1) =
7 · 10− S · 1qt>0 −
It−1+qt+It
2 · 1 if It−1 + qt ≥ 10
7 · (It−1 + qt)− S · 1qt>0 − It−1+qt2 · 1 if It−1 + qt < 10
where, 1 is the indicator function.
A participant i’s inventory policy for year a is the sequence of the twelve monthly quantity
orders, Qi,a = (qi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,12). For a given inventory policy S-store’s annual profits are,
Πi,a(Qi,a) =
12∑
t=1
pit.
In the supply chain literature, the set of EOQ policies is the subset of inventory policies which
only place a quantity order once inventory reaches zero with no stockouts allowed. In our
dynamic decision making environment, stockouts can occur if a non-optimal policy was chosen
previously. Correspondingly we adjust the definition of an EOQ policy to classify choices at
these points off the optimal path.
Definition 1. An EOQ action is a temporal inventory management decision satisfying the
following conditions:
(1). A participant only orders when the closing inventory of the previous period is less than 10
units, i.e., qt > 0 when It−1 < 10;
(2). A participant doesn’t order when the closing inventory of the previous period is more than
10 units, i.e., qt = 0 when It−1 ≥ 10;
(3). Participant’s order guarantees no stockouts in t, i.e., It−1 + qt ≥ 10.
Definition 2. An EOQ policy is a inventory management policy that consists only of EOQ
actions.
The original EOQ model solution is derived assuming an infinite demand horizon, in which the
average cost minimizing EOQ policy is to order the following quantity whenever the closing
inventory of the previous period is zero,
q∗ =
√
2DS
h
. (1)
6
In our context then the cost minimizing policy would be to order 30 coffee makers, an EOQ
cycle length of three months, whenever closing inventory of the previous period is zero. This
would also be the profit maximizing policy as average revenue is constant, up to the monthly
demand capacity, and greater than the minimum average cost. In our finite horizon setting the
optimal policy does not change. But if an inventory manager deviates from this policy early in
the year the optimal course can involve alternative EOQ actions later in the year.
Schwarz (1972) characterizes the optimal EOQ policies for the finite horizon of T months. First,
we note the result that average total cost minimizing policy is to order according to Equation 1
if T is an integer multiple of the
q∗
D
. As simply following the EOQ policy of ordering 10 units
each period is profitable in our environment, profit maximization will call for satisfying the full
annual demand. The EOQ policy of always taking the EOQ action of 30 when inventory is
depleted maximizes profit in addition to minimizing average cost.
As individuals can and do fail to act suboptimally we now consider alternative, i.e. shorter in
this case, decision horizons. Let C(T ) be total incremental cost over the finite time interval T .
We restrict our attention to policies which only place orders when inventory is zero. An EOQ
cycle length is the interval of months between such orders, denoted by sk, which is the interval
between the (k − 1)th and the kth order. Let C(sk) be the total incremental cost for an EOQ
cycle, and n be the number of orders over T . We can formulate the problem as
min C(T ) =
n∑
k=1
C(sk) s.t.
n∑
k=1
sk = T
where
C(sk) = S + hDt
2/2.
From the quadratic formulation, it is clear that in the optimal solution all of the sk are of the
same length. An EOQ constant inventory policy, denoted Q¯sk , is one with a constant cycle
length.
Let Cn(T ) be the total incremental cost for the interval T given n orders,
Cn(T ) = nS + hDT 2/2n.
Minimising Cn(T ) gives
n∗ =
√
hDT 2
2S
.
Notice for the first month in our task, i.e. T = 12, this yields the same solution as the infinite
horizon formulation, n∗ = 4 and s∗k = 3. Further investigations on situations when the horizon
T is sufficiently small reveals that The optimal number of orders, n∗, is the smallest integer
satisfying n(n+ 1) ≥ hDT
2
2S
. With the parameter values in our task, Table 1 gives an overview
of the optimal solutions for different values of T .
With our finite horizon of one year, the following set of constant EOQ cycles sk = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12}
and the corresponding constant EOQ policies are of particular interest. Table 2 shows for these
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Table 1: Optimal solutions for different T in our task
Month T
hDT 2
2S
n∗(n∗ + 1)
The optimal
order number
(n∗)
The optimal EOQ
cycle length (s∗k)
sequence
The optimal
order size (q∗k)
12 1 0.111 2 1 {1} {10}
11 2 0.444 2 1 {2} {20}
10 3 1 2 1 {3} {30}
9 4 1.778 2 1 {4} {40}
8 5 2.778 6 2 {3, 2} {30, 20}
7 6 4 6 2 {3, 3} {30, 30}
6 7 5.444 6 2 {3, 4} {30, 40}
5 8 7.111 12 3 {3, 3, 2} {30, 30, 20}
4 9 9 12 3 {3, 3, 3} {30, 30, 30}
3 10 11.111 12 3 {3, 3, 4} {30, 30, 40}
2 11 13.444 20 4 {3, 3, 3, 2} {30, 30, 30, 20}
1 12 16 20 4 {3, 3, 3, 3} {30, 30, 30, 30}
EOQ constant policies the corresponding annual profits, the number of orders placed annually
and the percentage of maximum potential annual profits, i.e. efficiency. Notice that EOQ con-
stant 2 and 4 both generate over 93% of the potential annual profits. Given the minimal loss
incurred by adopting these policies we define an alternative decision quality benchmark. When
a participant chooses sk = {2, 4} we call this “near optimal” performance.
Table 2: Alternative EOQ constant strategies which do not generate stock-outs or positive
closing inventories in month 12 and their respective performance properties.
Q¯sk
The number
of orders per
year
Constant
order size
Profit per
EOQ cycle
Annual profit Efficiency
12 1 120 75 75 15.63%
6 2 60 195 390 81.25%
4 3 40 155 465 96.88%
3 4 30 120 480 100.00%
2 6 20 75 450 93.75%
1 12 10 20 240 50.00%
2.2 Experimental design
Our experimental design has two treatment variables, each of which has two categories. This
generates a 2×2 factorial experimental design. We adopt a between subject design, a participant
only experiences one of the four possible treatment cells.
The first treatment variable is the feasible set of inventory policies a participant can follow. The
first category is called “Unrestricted” where a participant can choose any quantity they wish
each month as long as the quantity does not exceed 120. The second category is called “Zero
Only”, where participants are restricted to ordering only once the inventory level is zero. We
expect that the larger set of alternatives in the unrestricted category presents participants with
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a more difficult learning task.
The second treatment variable is the level of exogenous cognitive load burden we induce by
introducing a competing task. In the “Low” cognitive load category participants complete the
inventory tasks without distractions. In the “High” cognitive load we introduce an incentivized
PIN task that is completed along side the inventory management task and requires the utilization
of short term memory. At the start of each year a participant is given 15 seconds to memorise
a random 6-digit PIN. The PIN is case sensitive, consisting of numbers, upper and lower case
letters.3 After the completion of the year, a participant is prompted to enter the PIN. Entering
the correct PIN unlocks an extra reward of 300. A participants only has one attempt at the
PIN task. If a participant actively tries to complete the PIN task successfully we expect the
diminished access to short term memory to reduce decision making quality and the speed of
any learning.
Table 3 summarizes our experimental design and provides summary statistics on the demo-
graphics of the participants. We designate treatment cells by the word pairs x -y, where x is
feasible set of policies category and y is category of the cognitive load.
Table 3: Summary of the demographic information of participants for each treatment
Treatment cell Participants
Average
age
Male Postgrad
STEM
subjects1
Average math
level2
Unrestricted-Low 41 25 34% 49% 37% 3.68
Unrestricted-High 41 25 37% 44% 56% 3.20
Zero Only-Low 39 25 23% 47% 34% 3.26
Zero Only-High 36 28 50% 56% 28% 3.53
1 STEM subjects include Engineering & Technology, Life Sciences & Medicine and Natural Sciences.
Non-STEM subjects include Arts & Humanities and Social Sciences & Management.
2 Math Level was self-assessed, and was categorised into 6 levels. 1 = “Below GCSE”, 2 = “GCSE”, 3
= “A Level”, 4 = “Undergraduate”, 5 = “Postgraduate”, 6 = “Above Postgraduate”. Note that GCSE
(General Certificate of Secondary Education) is an academic qualification in a specific subject typically
taken by school students aged 14-16 of the UK (except Scotland), at a level below A level.
2.3 Experimental procedures
Seven sessions were conducted at Newcastle University Business School experimental economics
laboratory during May and July 2017. 162 participants4 were recruited via random selection
for invitation from a participant pool database of the Behavioural Economics Northeast Clus-
ter. All participants were students from Newcastle University except for three who were from
Northumbria University.
3The PIN is the same for all particpants across each year to ensure control.
4 We excluded five participants from our data analysis and the participant counts given in Table 3. One
participant, in the Zero Only-Low treatment, always submitted the random slider starting position when inventory
reached zero. Two other participants, in the Zero Only-High treatment, grossly took advantage of the limited
liability rule. The final two excluded participants attended the last session and demonstrated behaviour that
they had been briefed about the content of the experiment; they clicked through the instructions without reading
them and subsequently provided the solution Q¯3 for all years - even though this was not optimal for the practice
year.
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Each session lasted no more than sixty minutes, with strict procedures to limit the access to any
aides that would provide assistance in calculations or remembering PIN codes. Participants were
signed in individually and instructed to leave their personal belongings, including any writing
instruments, in the reception area before being escorted to a computer desk placed in a privacy
carrel. Each participant was then provided with a pen and two copies of an informed consent
document, which they read and signed if they wished to continue their participation. The
pen and signed forms were then collected by a monitor. After which participants were sternly
informed that no electronic devices - such as mobile phones, calculator, smart watches, etc. -
could be used until their session was completed. They were further instructed that the rest
of the experimental tasks were fully computerized and they would complete the rest of the
experiment only using their mouse. Prior to participants entering the laboratory, all computer
keyboards were concealed under a thick opaque cover. This was to done to diminish any access
to mnemonic devices for remembering PIN codes. These measures were taken in all sessions to
provide control between High and Low cognitive load treatments.
The experiment itself was conducted using a self-contained program developed in oTree (Chen
et al., 2016). Access was restricted to other programs on the computer. The sum of these
measures eliminated many of the tools participants commonly used to perform mathematical
calculations. This dismal work environment was applied to all four treatment cells.
Once instructed to start by the monitor, participants read through the instructions5 at their
own pace. After reading the instructions, participants were asked to complete seven multiple
choice questions designed to ensure that they understand the calculation of costs and profits.
Participants who provided more than two incorrect answers had to review the mistaken questions
with one of the experimenters before proceeding to the decision tasks.
Participants then participated in the six year decision task sequence, followed by a short post-
experiment survey which collected demographic information. Year 0 was a practice round which
used an alternative set of cost parameters6 from those of Years 1 through 5, and the performance
in this task did not affect a participant’s total earnings. The purpose of the practice year was
to help familiarize the participants with the task and the decision screen. Orders were entered
by moving a slider whose value range was zero to one hundred and twenty. The initial point of
the slider was random each month, and in the case of an Zero Only treatment with a positive
starting inventory it was greyed out. The decision screen included a table providing the entire
history of a participant’s monthly ordering choices, as well as opening inventory, units sold,
closing inventory, sales revenue, ordering costs, holding costs and profits.7 For participants who
experienced the High cognitive load treatment, we provided an opportunity to practice the PIN
task in the practice Year.
Participants then completed the Years 1 through 5 decision tasks. Participants were paid for
their accumulated earnings from these decision tasks, at the conversion rate of 300 = £1, as
well as a £5 show-up fee. There was limited liability; to ensure the motivation to make profits
5 In the first Appendix, we provide a complete set of instructions.
6 In the practice year the order costs were 45 and the holding costs were 0.5.
7 We provide screen captures of these interfaces in the Appendices.
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would not be affected by a large negative earnings made in a particular year, any negative
profits made in a year will be treated as 0 earnings.8 The average earnings across all treatments
were £13.37 per participant, including the participation fee.9
One last important aspect of the experiment was the fixed length of time a participant had
to complete the inventory management task for a year. We required that a participant spend
exactly four minutes completing each task in Years 1 through 5. This was designed to prevent
participants from racing through the monthly decisions in order to reduce the cognitive cost of
remembering their PIN. If a participant completed their twelve monthly decisions early they
could not advance to the next period (or enter the PIN) until the four minutes expired. If they
failed to complete the twelve tasks before the time expired, the computer program executed the
remaining months sales with the existing inventory stock.
3 Empirical evaluation of treatment effects
We evaluate the treatment effects of restricted inventory policy choice sets and increased cogni-
tive load by considering their impacts upon participant’s earnings in the inventory management
tasks, the propensity to choose optimal inventory policies, and then the efficacy of the PIN task
and whether performance in that task is correlated with inventory performance.
3.1 Hypotheses
Our motivation of treatment variables leads to several natural hypotheses. Naturally, better
performance leads to greater average annual earnings and is indicated by greater percentage of
participants adopting optimal (near-optimal) inventories. Increases in cognitive load reduces
short term memory capacity and lead to diminished performance in both the Zero Only and
Unrestricted policy choice sets, giving the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.a. Participants perform better in the Zero Only-Low treatment than the Zero
Only-High treatment. This will be reflected in two measures: average annual earnings and the
percentage of participants who adopt optimal (near-optimal) inventories.
Hypothesis 1.b. Participants perform better in the Unrestricted-Low treatment than the Unrestricted-
High treatment. This will be reflected in two measures: average annual earnings and the per-
centage of participants who adopt optimal (near-optimal) inventories.
The set of inventory policies in the unrestricted is much larger than and only adds suboptimal
alternatives to the EOQ restricted set of policy choices. The reducing the focalness of EOQ
strategies and greatly complicating participants’ choice sets in the Unrestricted treatments leads
to our next set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.a. Participants perform better in the Zero Only-Low treatment than the Unrestricted-
Low treatment. This will be reflected in two measures: average annual earnings and the per-
centage of participants who adopt optimal (near-optimal) inventories.
8 This limited liability only affected the earnings of five participants in five different years.
9 The average earnings of Low treatment (without PIN task) was £11.58 per participant, while the average
earnings of High treatment (with PIN task) was £15.23 per participant.
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Hypothesis 2.b. Participants perform better in the Zero Only-High treatment than the Unrestricted-
High treatment. This will be reflected in two measures: average annual earnings and the per-
centage of participants who adopt optimal (near-optimal) inventories.
In our treatments that involve the PIN task, participants need to memorize the PIN as well as
making monthly ordering decisions. Buser and Peter (2012) define multitasking as switching
back and forth between two ongoing tasks, which can be applied in treatments with the PIN task.
Popular best-selling books10 advertise the stereotype that women are better at multitasking.
However, experimental results from Buser and Peter (2012) do not support such stereotype.
Our experiment is an opportunity to evaluate the women are better at multi-tasking conjecture
in an inventory management context.
Hypothesis 3. In treatments involving increased cognitive load, i.e., both Zero Only-High and
Unrestricted-High treatment, women perform better than men.
3.2 Annual inventory profits
We test the differences in average annual profit for different treatment groups using two-sided t-
tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. As participants have the best performance
with the intervention and without the cognitive load, we use Zero Only-Low treatment as
a reference point to demonstrate profit loss resulting from the presence of more complicated
choice sets and a shock to their cognitive load. We report the results of these hypotheses tests in
Table 4. The first two rows indicate that both the absence of the intervention and shocking their
cognitive load each negatively impact average annual profits both statistically and economically.
More complicated policy choices cause more profit loss than High cognitive load.
When we examine the effect of exogenously increasing a participant’s cognitive load conditional
on the policy choice set we find mixed support for Hypothesis 1. There is a statistically signifi-
cant reduction in average in earnings in the Zero Only treatment, but not in the Unrestricted
treatment. We do find stronger evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, as we find limiting partic-
ipant’s choices to EOQ restricted policies does lead to statistically greater average earnings in
both Low and High cognitive load settings.
A disaggregated view of the average annual profits permit insights into learning over time
and how our treatments impact it. Figure 1 presents these time trends for each of the four
treatments. There are several prominent features of this figure which provide refined insights
into our hypotheses results on the average profit levels. First, performance gains are mostly
achieved in Years 1 through 3. Second, average earnings are around 90% of the possible earnings
in the last two years; except for the Unrestricted-High treatment which are around 5-10% lower.
Third, High cognitive load and Unrestricted policy choice sets both cause the greatest negative
performance impact in Year 1.
We quantify and assess these remarks by conducting a series of dummy variable linear regres-
sions using random effects estimators and cluster standard errors at the level of the individuals.
10See for example Pease and Pease (2001) and its adaptation, Why Men Can Only Do One Thing at a Time
and Women Never Stop Talking (Pease and Pease, 2003).
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Table 4: Average annual profits by treatment and hypotheses tests for differences in average
annual earnings
Panel A: Annual profits by treatment
Unrestricted-Low Unrestricted-High Zero Only-Low Zero Only-High
Average 375.85 366.70 412.94 390.10
Stand. Dev. 129.38 126.87 97.35 113.78
Panel B: Hypotheses tests for differences in average annual profits (p-values reported)
Treatment Comparison Difference Profit loss
(%)
Two-sided
t-tests
Wilcoxon
rank-sum
Zero Only vs Unrestricted 30.71 7.64% 0.000 0.001
Low vs High 16.29 4.14% 0.055 0.003
Zero Only-Low vs Zero Only-High 22.84 5.53% 0.038 0.012
Unrestricted-Low vs Unrestricted-High 9.15 2.43% 0.470 0.124
Zero Only-Low vs Unrestricted-Low 37.09 8.98% 0.001 0.012
Zero Only-High vs Unrestricted-High 23.40 6.00% 0.059 0.052
Figure 1: Annual Profits over individual Years and by treatment: Averages and 95% confidence
intervals
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We report these results in Table 5. In model (1), we simply regress annual profit on a constant
and dummy variables for Years 1 through 4, rendering Year 5 the base level. In model (2) we
introduce dummy variables for the Zero Only and High treatment categories. In this case the
constant reflects the average profit level for Year 5 in the Unrestricted-Low treatment; and the
Year 1 through 4 dummy variable coefficients reflect the average annual profits across partic-
ipants in the Unrestricted-Low treatment. In model (3), we add interaction dummy variables
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for the Zero Only and High treatment categories to examine if their joint imposition leads to
super- or sub-additive impact on annual profit. In model (4), we add individual characteristic
dummy variables to exam individual differences.
Table 5: Dummy variable regressions for annual profit: random effects panel data (n=785)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual Profit Annual Profit Annual Profit Annual Profit
Year 1 -112.27∗∗∗ -112.80∗∗∗ -122.44∗∗∗ -122.44∗∗∗
(11.24) (18.34) (20.77) (20.83)
Zero Only*Year 1 45.45∗∗ 65.22∗∗ 63.91∗∗
(21.97) (26.77) (27.09)
High*Year 1 -43.20∗ -23.91 -23.91
(22.17) (32.23) (32.32)
Zero Only*High*Year 1 -40.40 -39.09
(44.19) (44.46)
Year 2 -73.39∗∗∗ -82.86∗∗∗ -80.89∗∗∗ -80.89∗∗∗
(10.02) (19.08) (22.92) (22.98)
Zero Only*Year 2 11.56 7.53 5.07
(20.05) (29.81) (30.10)
High*Year 2 8.04 4.11 4.11
(20.13) (29.94) (30.02)
Zero Only*High*Year 2 8.24 10.69
(40.13) (40.40)
Year 3 -38.81∗∗∗ -38.75∗∗ -59.41∗∗∗ -59.41∗∗∗
(7.78) (15.39) (18.34) (18.39)
Zero Only*Year 3 -16.24 26.15 28.35
(15.78) (22.69) (22.85)
High*Year 3 15.70 57.02∗∗∗ 57.02∗∗∗
(15.65) (19.90) (19.95)
Zero Only*High*Year 3 -86.59∗∗∗ -88.79∗∗∗
(30.82) (30.97)
Year 4 -12.85∗∗∗ -20.08∗∗ -23.09∗∗ -23.09∗∗
(4.61) (9.40) (11.57) (11.61)
Zero Only*Year 4 15.59∗ 21.75∗ 21.90∗
(9.03) (12.16) (12.23)
High*Year 4 -0.45 5.56 5.56
(9.25) (15.57) (15.62)
Zero Only*High*Year 4 -12.59 -12.74
(18.12) (18.19)
Zero Only 19.12∗ 12.96 14.30
(10.31) (13.87) (15.17)
High -11.70 -17.71 -22.49
(10.45) (16.25) (16.77)
Zero Only*High 12.58 15.31
(20.71) (22.68)
Male 15.04
(11.85)
Postgrad -14.88
(12.03)
STEM 12.18
(11.47)
Math Level -2.69
(5.13)
Constant 433.40∗∗∗ 430.01∗∗∗ 433.01∗∗∗ 440.60∗∗∗
(5.28) (8.56) (9.70) (20.84)
Wald χ2 183.28 210.84 228.77 239.23
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clusters in individuals
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Our treatment effects for Zero Only and High are largely generated by their Year 1 impacts as
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seen by their individually significant coefficients in models (2) and (3). We conduct a Chow
test, for which the null is model (1) versus the alternative of model (2), i.e. the joint differences
of the two treatments are significant. The resulting χ2-stat is 27.32, and has a p-value of 0.002.
We conduct a second Chow test to compare the veracity of model (3) versus model (2). The
resulting χ2-stat in this case is 8.73, and has a p-value of 0.120.
Our analyses of annual profits leads us to our first set of results.
Result 1. Reducing the participants’ policy choice sets to EOQ restricted ones leads to higher
profits. However, these gains predominantly occur in Year 1 - when the participants face the
inventory decision problem for the first time.
Result 2. Exogenously increasing participants’ cognitive load leads to lower profits. However,
these losses predominantly occur in Year 1 - when the participants face the inventory decision
problem for the first time.
Result 3. There is no super- or sub-additive effect of simultaneously exposing participants to
the Zero Only and High treatment categories.
Finally let’s consider the differences in average annual profit between male and female partici-
pants in treatments involving the PIN tasks. Among the participants who needed to memorize
the PINs as well as making monthly ordering decisions, the average annual profits of female and
male are 362.95 and 397.22 respectively. Surprisingly, women are not better at multitasking as
stereotype suggests. This difference of 34.26 is statistically significant according to both a t-test
(p-value = 0.006) and a Mann-Whitney test (p-value = 0.000), which leads to our next result.
Result 4. When there are two ongoing tasks, women performs worse than men in terms of
profits.
3.3 Inventory management policy choices
We turn our analysis towards the inventory policy choices of participants. For each participant
we evaluate each of the annual inventory policies, Qi,a, for whether it is optimal, Q¯
3, or if its
near-optimal, and EOQ constant strategy of either Q¯2 or Q¯4 . Figure 2 depicts the evolution
across years of the percentages of participants following optimal and near-optimal policies in
each treatment. Inspection of this figure reveals our next set of results.
Result 5. There is a trend in all treatments for increasing use of optimal and near-optimal
policies from Year 1 to Year 4.
Result 6. High cognitive loads leads to lower percentage use of these policies for both Zero Only
and Unrestricted in all five Years.
3.4 Efficacy of the PIN reward procedure
Next we evaluate the efficacy of procedure for exogenously increasing the cognitive load. Our
experimental design faces a challenging balancing act. If the PIN reward procedure is too simple
participants will always collect the reward utilizing minimal short run memory resources, and if
it is too difficult they could either decide to forgo the mental costs of trying to commit the PIN
to short term memory or forgo effort in the Inventory management tasks. A second concern
is that raw intelligence is an omitted variable in our analysis which would manifest itself in
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Figure 2: Stacked graph of the percentage of participants following optimal and near-optimal
EOQ constant strategies: by Year and treatment
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a strong positive correlation between a participant’s performances in the PIN reward and the
Inventory management task.
We provide visual evidence that our design successfully addresses this balancing act in Figure 3.
First, we observe that only three out of the seventy-seven participants earned one or less PIN
rewards; and at the same time thirty-three out of seventy-seven collected all five pin rewards.
Second, there doesn’t appear to be a clustering of poor Inventory management performers,
below the ad hoc threshold of 1500, on high or low numbers of earned PIN rewards. Third,
there is little evident differences in the conditional means of total profits - suggesting the PIN
and inventory management tasks performance are independent.
We quantify the evidence of the independence of PIN and Inventory management task perfor-
mance by statistically measuring their correlation and testing its statistical significance. Table 6
reports these correlations and the p-values of the hypotheses tests that the correlation is zero.
The left portion of the table addresses the correlation between the success of a PIN reward task
and the corresponding annual inventory profit. The evidence is mixed. We don’t find correla-
tions significantly different from zero in four out of five years, but do find a highly significant
positive correlation when we pool all of the years. This analysis suggests potential positive
correlation between a correct PIN tasks and individual reward; however this analysis does not
allowing for differences in participants’ performances for the PIN task. To address this concern
we evaluate the correlations between the total number of PIN rewards earned by a participant
j and both j’s annual profits and her total Inventory tasks profit. We report these correlations
in the right side of Table 6. In this analysis we find evidence in favor of no correlation. None
of these correlations is significant.
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Figure 3: Participants’ total inventory management task profits conditional on the number of
PIN rewards earned and the corresponding whisker plots for the 50, 75, and 95% quantiles. The
numbers across the top are the counts of participants who earned the corresponding number of
PIN rewards.
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Table 6: Spearman correlations between PIN reward earned in Year a by participant j and
j’s corresponding Inventory task profit; Spearman and Pearson Rank correlations between a
participant j’s total number of earned PIN rewards and their Inventory task profits
PIN reward eared in Year a Number of PIN reward earned
Spearman Rank Corr. Pearson Corr. Spearman Rank Corr.
Annual
Profit
Year 1 0.08 0.13 0.11
(0.512) (0.248) (0.324)
Year 2 0.12 0.08 0.11
(0.315) (0.507) (0.338)
Year 3 0.21 0.10 0.04
(0.072) (0.391) (0.750)
Year 4 0.09 0.15 0.04
(0.459) (0.182) (0.725)
Year 5 0.14 0.10 0.14
(0.226) (0.379) (0.218)
All Years 0.18 N/A N/A
(0.001) N/A N/A
Total Profit
N/A 0.179 0.182
N/A (0.120) (0.114)
1. The p-values of the respective tests are reported in the parenthesis.
2. We don’t report the correlations for Total Profit in column three because the calculation will
include multiple repetitions of a participant’s total inventory profit.
3. We don’t report the correlations for all Years in columns for and five because the calculation will
include multiple repetitions of a participant’s total number of PIN rewards.
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4 Learning Dynamics
Rapid behavioural adjustment during the first three annual iterations of our task is one of the
most striking features of our data. What is the process of this individual learning? How do the
two external sources of cognitive stress impact this process? These are two questions we next
attempt to answer. In the management science and behavioural economics literatures, a common
approach to model this type of learning often flies under the flag of Experienced Weighted
Attraction (EWA) learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999). This approach often considers a blend of
simple reinforcement and adaptive payoff expectation valuations for each alternative strategy,
and then for the individual to choose the alternatives according to a probability function that
puts a higher probability of choice on higher “scoring” alternatives (Amaldoss and Jain, 2010;
Kalkanci et al., 2011; Kalkancı et al., 2014; Brandts et al., 2016; Feng and Zhang, 2017). These
scores are then updated over time based on counterfactual payoffs and previous decisions.
There are several reasons why a framework such as EWA learning model is a poor fit for our
tasks. First, and most importantly, our choice is the amount of demand to order and which
has a prominent monotonicity in the number of months. However, the payoff consequences for
inventory orders is not monotonic in the number of months. As the information for participants
to calculate and maximise the scores of the alternatives are available to them, it seems that
the two external sources of cognitive stress impact the learning process in a way of preventing
participants from making the calculation and arriving inertia of the optimal choice. A natural
way for participants to adjust their orders in is to explore how their performance responds to
increases or decreases from previous orders. However, this will inevitably lead to violations of
the higher score implies higher probability of choice paradigm of EWA-like learning models.
A second problem is the relative low number of actual positive EOQ quantities a participant
has an opportunity to make. These makes the estimates of initial scores of the alternatives
overly influential on the estimation of the parameters of interest hence the process of learning
was not properly reflected.11 In response to the issues we turn to an alternative learning
model introduced by Shachat and Zhang (2017), which accommodates the potential conflict of a
natural ordering of the choice set not having monotonicity in value, allows for minimal individual
rationality, and successfully works when there are a relatively low number of decisions.
In our final analysis we present and estimate a Markovian learning model for participants’
monthly order choices. Generally avoiding stockout12 - thus not foregoing potential profit -
and only ordering when sales have exhausted inventory - thus avoiding excess holding costs -
are two key logical motivations for choosing EOQ consistent actions. We formulate a learning
11 We have estimated, or attempted to in some cases, various reinforcement learning model (Erev and Roth,
1998) and experienced-weighted attraction learning models (Camerer and Ho, 1999) with logistic linkin functions.
We have not reported these results because estimates of the variance term in the link function reversed the higher
score - high probability of choice ranking, locked into extreme initial attraction levels, or failed to converge.
12 We recognise that with our setting, especially in later months, it may be more profitable to suffer a stockout
when the open inventory is not too far short from the demand. For instance, in month 9 the optimal dynamic
solution is to order 40. However, if open inventory is above 6 units in month 9, it would be more profitable to
suffer a stockout and wait until period 10 to order 30. This may lead to a situation in Unrestricted treatment,
in which participant deliberately wait out a stockout. However, out of 4920 observations from Unrestricted
treatment, such situation never occurred.
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process for monthly choices as a decision tree where the first branch is avoiding one of these
two pitfalls, and the second branch is the Markov process by which one chooses an EOQ cycle
when inventory reaches zero. Figure 4 depicts this process.
Figure 4: The branching decision process. First, there is a choice of proceeding to Branch 1
and taking Non-EOQ action or Branch 2 and taking an EOQ action. This formulation depends
upon whether the closing inventory of previous period is greater or less than 10.
It−1 < 10
qt < 10− It−1
Non-EOQ Action
(Stockout)
EOQ cycle order
EOQ action
(a) Decision process when the closing inventory
of previous period is strictly less than ten.
It−1 ≥ 10
qt > 0
Non-EOQ Action
(Excess holding cost)
qt = 0
EOQ action
(b) Decision process when the closing in-
ventory of previous period is greater than
ten.
We will formulate the probabilities of choosing Non-EOQ actions as simple Logit functions of
time, habit formation and whether it is a High cognitive load treatment. As the experimental
design prunes Branch 1 for the EOQ treatment for the most part, of key interest here is whether
High cognitive load leads to larger probabilities of Non-EOQ actions. Then when an individual
chooses an order once inventory reaches zero, we use a low rationality Markov model to specify
how participants switch from one EOQ cycle length to another. In this model we examine the
probability of switching to an at least as profitable EOQ action and the viscosity to making
large changes to EOQ cycle length.
4.1 Branch Decision 1
To investigate the factors that influence the probability of participants deviating from an EOQ
action in any one of the sixty decision rounds with financial incentives we first define and
indicator function for
NonEOQi,r =
1 if qi,r is not an EOQ action in decision round r, and0 otherwise.
where r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 60}.
We estimate sets of Logit regressions on the probability a participant chooses a Non-EOQ action
for two cases; one when the previous month’s closing inventory is strictly less than ten and one
when it is at least ten. In both cases we consider the following specification
Pr(NonEOQi,r = 1) = F (β0 + β1Y earr + β2Monthr + β3High+ β4NonEOQACCi,r−1).
Here F is the logistic cumulative distribution function and NonEOQACCi,r−1 is the total
number of rounds participant i has deviated from EOQ up through round r−1 - this is intended
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to capture any habit formation. Note this is a running count of an participant’s Non-EOQ
actions in either state.
The Logit regression results are presented in Table 7: Panel A for the case It−1 < 10 and Panel
B for the case It−1 ≥ 10. For the prior case, deviations from an EOQ action occur due to
the possibilities of stockouts. While our design was motivated to only allow participants in the
Unrestricted to make such Non-EOQ actions, it may also happen in the Zero Only treatment
when a participant orders less than 10 when the closing inventory of previous period is 0. There
are only 40 such observations out of 4500, but we do include these in the Panel A results.13
For the latter case - the closing inventory of previous period is at least ten - the only possible
deviation from an EOQ action is to order a strictly positive amount, which is not allowed in
the Zero Only treatment group.
Table 7: Logit regression on the probability of deviating from an EOQ action
Panel A: It−1 < 10 Panel B: It−1 ≥ 10
NonEOQi,r (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y earr -0.498
∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.128) (0.160) (0.096) (0.097) (0.134)
Monthr 0.194
∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
High 0.255 0.216 -0.404 -0.193
(0.425) (0.311) (0.376) (0.296)
NonEOQACCi,r−1 0.288∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040)
Constant -3.379∗∗∗ -3.507∗∗∗ -3.175∗∗∗ -1.754∗∗∗ -1.573∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗
(0.583) (0.630) (0.690) (0.338) (0.397) (0.430)
N 3032 3032 2875 3286 3286 3286
χ2 34.10∗∗∗ 36.06∗∗∗ 97.89∗∗∗ 22.66∗∗∗ 22.90∗∗∗ 75.76∗∗∗
Pr(NonEOQi,r) = 1 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.030
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clusters in individuals
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
First, note the large negative values of the estimated coefficients pushing the argument of the
logistic CDF to its far left tail. Thus all estimated probabilities of Non-EOQ actions are small
as indicated by the last row of the table which reports the estimated probability of a Non-EOQ
action at the average level of the factors. Second, two significant factors, both statistically
and economically, are the number of years and the accumulation of experience of choosing
Non-EOQ actions. The large estimated coefficient indicates there is significant learning to
choose EOQ actions across the five years. The positive estimated value of the coefficient of
NonEOQACCi,r−1 captures the individual differences in the epiphany of the EOQ logic. The
estimated coefficients for Months are statistically significant, but have low magnitude in moving
probabilities meaningfully are of opposite signs in two cases. This suggests that stockouts are
more likely later in a year while ordering when there is excess inventory is less likely later in
a year. Surprisingly there is no significant effect of having a high cognitive load on taking
13 Also there is another possible way to deviate from an EOQ action in the Zero Only treatment. Participants
may have positive closing inventory of previous period that is less than 10 but are not allowed to place order (138
out 4500 observations). We exclude these observations as they are not by choice.
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Non-EOQ actions. Thus the performance differences must come from the types of EOQ actions
one takes under high cognitive load. Overall we interpret this evidence that providing the more
complicated choice set does lead to some Non-EOQ actions, but these choices diminish with
experience.
4.2 Branch Decision 2: A Markov model of EOQ cycle choice
Once an EOQ action is taken, the second branches in Figure 4, we consider how the participant
chooses an EOQ cycle length. First, we make a slight modification to our definition of an EOQ
cycle to handle situations in the Unrestricted treatment when the previous month’s closing
inventory is strictly positive but strictly less than ten. Let s˜i,k denotes the largest integer less
than or equal to It−1+qt10 . To see how this change of definition works consider the following
simple example. If a participant has a closing inventory of 2 units from previous period and
orders 8 units, then s˜i,k = 1. Figure 14 shows histograms of EOQ cycles choices using this
new definition in both Unrestricted and Zero Only treatments. This figure illustrates that we
see more of the typically optimal EOQ cycles of length three in the Zero Only treatment, and
more extreme EOQ cycles of lengths one and twelve in the Unrestricted treatment. Using the
information of Figure 14 we move forward considering the set of possible EOQ cycle length
s˜i,k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}.14
Figure 5: EOQ cycle choice histograms for Zero Only and Unrestricted treatments
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Proceeding to the dynamics of a participant’s sequence of EOQ cycle choices, we compare the
relative ranking of alternative EOQ cycles by their monthly average profit conditional upon
month. We denote this monthly average profit as p¯it(s˜i,k). Notice that the pay off function
depends upon t and will penalize relatively long EOQ cycles that generate excess inventory at
the year’s end. We report the values of p¯it(s˜i,k) in Table 8.
We use this measure to evaluate whether a participant’s EOQ cycle choice generates a higher
14 Due to the low number of observations we round down EOQ cycles of s˜i,k = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11} to s˜i,k = 6.
Also, note that we are including s˜i,k = 5 as an EOQ choice cycle given the high frequency it is chosen despite it
not corresponding to a EOQ constant policy.
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Table 8: Average monthly profit for alternative EOQ cycle choice given the current month
s 1 2 3 4 5 6 121
Month 1-7 20 37.5 40 38.75 36 32.5 -
Month 8 20 37.5 40 38.75 36 26 -
Month 9 20 37.5 40 38.75 28.75 18.75 -
Month 10 20 37.5 40 30 20 10 -
Month 11 20 37.5 27.5 17.5 7.5 -2.5 -
Month 12 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -
1 s˜i,k = 12 always offers the lowest average monthly payoff
monthly average profit than their previous EOQ cycle choice. For each individual we consider
the proportions of transitions to higher, the same, and lower profit cycles. We plot these
proportions by treatment cell in Figure 6 and sort individuals by the proportion of ‘better’
transitions. This figure illustrates that participants exhibit rather limited individual rationality
as their frequency of transitioning to a more profitable EOQ cycle tend to only slightly exceed
that of switching to a less profitable cycle. Further there is a large amount of EOQ cycle choice
repetition.
Figure 6: Proportions of Better, Same and Worse EOQ cycle transitions - ranked by Better
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For a situation in which individuals similarly do not find the subset of higher ranked alternatives
salient and there is an ordinal property - but not always monotonic in reward - to the set of
alternatives, Shachat and Zhang (2017) introduced a Markov model of limited rationality to
describe learning. We adapt that model for our setting. EOQ cycle transitions probabilities
are governed by a two-stage process. In the first stage, probability is allocated between two
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subsets of possible EOQ cycles: NW, the subset of EOQ cycles no worse than s˜i,k−1, and NB,
the subset of EOQ cycles no better than s˜i,k−1.15 Specifically,
NWt(s˜i,k−1) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}|p¯it(j) ≥ p¯it(s˜i,k−1)}
NBt(s˜i,k−1) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}|p¯it(j) ≤ p¯it(s˜i,k−1)}
NW and NB may not be mutually exclusive; they will share the previous choice of an EOQ
cycle when there are sufficient months remaining in the year. We assume that an α measure of
probability is allocated to the NW set and a 1−α measure of probability is assigned to the NB
set.
In the second stage, probability measure is allocated amongst the elements within each of these
subsets. Such allocation is allowed to reflect participants possibly favouring the cycle having a
smaller difference in length with the previous cycle. Specially, probability is allocated according
to the number of steps between an element and the previous cycle length. The step count
between EOQ cycle length j and j′ is defined as,
θ(j, j′) = |j − j′|+ 1.
A special case of j = 12 is treated as 2 steps from j′ = 6.
We use the following weighting function to determine an EOQ cycle’s assigned share of proba-
bility measure,
w(j|s˜i,k−1, Z, λ) = θ(j, s˜i,k−1)
λ∑
j′∈Z θ(j′, s˜i,k−1)λ
, ∀j ∈ Z
in which Z is either the NW or NB subset. In the proportional assignment, λ ≤ 0 measures
the strength of the bias for small changes within the subset Z. A decrease in λ corresponds to
a growing bias. We calculate the transition probability for each EOQ cycle by adding up the
probability measures it is allocated from the NW and NB subsets,
Pr(s˜i,k = j|s˜i,k−1) = α× 1(j∈NWt(s˜i,k−1)) × w(j|s˜i,k−1, NWt(s˜i,k−1), λ)
+ (1− α)× 1(j∈NBt(s˜i,k−1)) × w(j|s˜i,k−1, NBt(s˜i,k−1), λ)
For example, if s˜i,3 = 1 and s˜i,4 = 3, the transition probability is α
3λ∑6
j=1 j
λ
, while if s˜i,11 = 1
and s˜i,12 = 3, the transition probability is (1− α) 3λ∑7
j=1 j
λ
.
We estimate the two parameters of the Markov choice model for each treatment cell by max-
imum likelihood estimation and present them in Table 9. In all treatments, the magnitude of
approximately 70% of α indicates that participants are more likely to move into their current
NW set. However, the absence of the intervention and introducing cognitive load reduce the
probability of switching to more profitable actions. The estimate of λ is larger in magnitude
for the Unrestricted treatments, indicating a larger bias for small changes within the sets. The
15 These subsets change depending on which month the choice occurs due to finite horizon. For instance,
s˜i,k = 3 would be in NW subset of s˜i,k−1 = 1 in month 10, but will change to be in NB subset in month 12. A
detailed listing on NW and NB subsets for different month can be found in Appendix C.
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ability to order in any month leads to a greater degree of action lock-in. However, the differ-
ences of the estimates of the parameters are not statistically significant when we estimate these
coefficients jointly and test for differences due to heterogeneity.
Table 9: Parameter estimates for the Markov EOQ cycle choice model, standard errors in
parentheses
Parameter Unrestricted-Low Unrestricted-High Zero Only-Low Zero Only-High
α 0.708 0.676 0.760 0.712
(0.041) (0.040) (0.031) (0.032)
λ -1.104 -1.320 -0.709 -0.782
(0.217) (0.209) (0.178) (0.137)
Table 10: Differences in parameter estimates for the Markov EOQ cycle choice model
Parameter α λ
Treatment Comparison Difference p-value Difference p-value
Unrestricted-Low vs Unrestricted-High 0.032 0.575 0.216 0.475
Zero Only-Low vs Zero Only-High 0.048 0.284 0.074 0.744
Unrestricted-Low vs Zero Only-Low -0.052 0.310 -0.396 0.159
Unrestricted-High vs Zero Only-High -0.036 0.487 -0.538 0.032
Overall we find the Unrestricted treatment leads to a small percentage of Non-EOQ actions,
generating performance diminishing outcomes of excess inventories and stockouts. However,
we find the likelihood of these events diminish over time and is surprisingly unaffected by high
cognitive loads. The more complex choice sets of the Unrestricted treatment also leads to
more inertia in EOQ cycle length choices inducing choice lock-in. This is a likely cause of
participants choosing near rather than absolute optimal policies in the last two years. This
is a similar phenomenon found in Caplin et al. (2011); as they increase choice set complexity
participants tend to switch within a smaller range of values.16 The effect of the High cognitive
load is for participants to exhibit a lower level of rationality once they choose EOQ actions; their
probability of choosing EOQ cycles that generate at least the same level of average monthly
profit is lower than for those participants who do not have the competing PIN memorization
task.
5 Conclusion
We present an experimental investigation to assess the effect of cognitive stress on inventory
management decisions in an EOQ model. We exogenously impose cognitive stress from a PIN
task that competes for the participants’ short term memory resources, and reduce cognitive
stress by introducing an intervention that limits the complexity of the inventory policy choice set.
Increases in cognitive load negatively impact participants’ performance. However, these negative
impacts occur predominantly when participants first face the inventory decision problem. While
16 See Caplin et al. (2011, page 2909) - Figure 4 for a comparison on the range of values observed with varying
choice set complexity.
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average performance is not statistically different, we note that only in the Zero Only-Low
treatment cell do we observe the majority of participants eventually learn to use the optimal
EOQ policy. We model and then estimate participants learning of monthly action choices using
a Markovian learning framework. We find that the availability of the more complicated choice
set causes some deviations from EOQ actions, but such deviations diminish with experience.
Further, the ability to order in any month leads to a greater degree of EOQ cycle length choice
lock-in. Increased cognitive load reduces the probability of switching to more profitable actions.
The EOQ is a prevalent tool of inventory managers in the field. Our results provide managerial
insights, particularly in the case of inventory managers of multiple product lines. It is clear
that asking such individuals to simultaneously complete multiple tasks impedes their learning
of effective inventory management. Further, there is value in restricting the manager’s possible
actions to those consistent with EOQ policies. This suggests increasing the difficulty of over-
riding ERP recommendations will increase performance. Absent this intervention, there is a
greater chance of locking into suboptimal EOQ cycles. Of course, in the long run we observe
near identical performance with enough experience. But one should proceed with caution think-
ing that good management will arise eventually with experience; our environment is constant
and certain. Chen and Wu (2017) demonstrated that changing ordering and holding costs will
slow the learning process.
We believe this is a successful first step in evaluating and developing interventions to minimize
the impact of cognitive stress on inventory management performance. Our ex ante expectation
was that cognitive load would have the more severe impact that would manifest itself in more
varied directions that choice set complexity. However, it does appear that presentation of policies
has the more complicated, and hence providing more scope for intervention design, impact on the
decision-making process. Some natural next steps are to explore how the choice set complexity
and corresponding framing impact decision making in the other previously raised inventory
management paradigms such as the newsvendor problem, (S, s) inventory management, and
multi-tiered supply chains.
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A Experiment Instructions and Interface
Instructions for different treatments are presented as the texts/sentences in italics and square
brackets below.
A.1 Instruction Page
Welcome
Welcome to today’s experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully as they are
directly relevant to how much money you will earn today. Please do not communicate with
other people during the experiment. Please note that you are not permitted to use pen
and paper or a mobile phone. Please kindly switch your mobile phone off or put it on silent
mode. Students causing a disturbance will be asked to leave the room. You will enter all of your
decisions in todays experiment using only the computer mouse. Please do not attempt to use the
keyboard or remove the keyboard cover. The information displayed on your computer monitor
is private and specific to you. All monetary amounts in todays experiment are expressed as
experimental currency units (ECU). The conversion rate for ECU and GBP is 300 ECU = £1
cash payment. Your payment will be rounded up to the nearest ten pence.
If you have any questions at any point during today’s session, please raise your hand and one
of the monitors will come to help.
Task
In todays experiment, you will be making inventory management decisions for an enterprise
called S-Store. S-Store sells coffee makers. You will perform this role for a sequence of 6 years.
Every month you will decide how many coffee makers to order from the coffee maker supplier.
Your earnings in this experiment will be proportional to the total profitability of S-Store. S-
store will sell a new coffee maker model every year. Thus in the first month of a year your
inventory always starts from zero. Further, any coffee makers remaining in inventory at the end
of month 12 will be disposed of. To summarise, you will be making 12 monthly decisions for a
year, and you will do this for 6 years in total.
You will have up to 4 minutes to complete your task for each year. Year 1 is a practice
round, and you will have up to 7 minutes to complete the task for this year. You should use
this as an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the software and decision tasks. If you dont
finish within the time allowed, the computer will automatically execute the remaining month(s)
sales with the existing inventory. You will not be able to add inventory. A ‘wait page’ displays
automatically if you spend less than the allowed time in a year. You will only be able to proceed
to the next year when the remaining time runs out.
Before the decision making portion of the experiment begins, there will be a Quiz consisting
of 7 simple questions to check your understanding of the task. Please answer the questions
carefully. If you missed 3 or more questions, you would be asked review the correct answers
before you can proceed to the task.
[The following italic texts are additional for treatments with High Cognitive Loads]
PIN
In addition to the task, you will be given a 7-digit PIN at the beginning of each year. The PIN
is case sensitive, and consisting of numbers, uppercase and lowercase letters. You will have 15
seconds to remember the PIN. This is your KEY to unlock an account which contains an extra
reward of 300 ECU. You can open the account at the end of each year by correctly entering the
PIN. You will only have one attempt to correctly enter the pin to claim this extra reward.
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Payment
Year 0 is a practice round, and you will receive no earnings from your decisions in this year. For
Years 1 through 5, your earnings will accumulate across years. At the end of the experiment
you will be paid £5 show-up fee and your accumulated earnings, converted to Pounds. Note,
negative profit may occur if poor coffee maker ordering decisions are made. To ensure that no
one will leave the experiment with a payment less than £5, a negative total profit made in Year
1 to Year 5 will be treated as 0 earnings.
A.2 Background Information
[The following Background Information section shows up on every decision page.]
Your Role:
S-Store is open 360 days per year. You are the inventory manager for S-Store. In your role, you
will control S-Stores inventory level which determines the stores total profits.
We now explain how S-Stores, and correspondingly you, earns profit. While we are explaining
how the calculations are made, during the decision tasks the computer will carry out these
calculations and report the results to you.
S-Store sells coffee makers at a price of 7 ECU per unit. S-Store can sell up to 10 coffee
makers per month. A coffee maker can only be sold if there is a unit held in inventory. If
you hold 10 or more units in inventory at the start of the month, S-Store will sell 10 coffee
makers that month. However, if there are less than 10 units held in inventory at the start of
the month then S-Store will only sell that amount. For example, if there are 2 units held in
inventory at the beginning of a month then S-Store only sells 2 units that month. [(For Zero
Only treatment only) You can only place an order when the current months opening inventory
is 0. For example, if the current months opening inventory is 3 units, you cannot place an
order this month, S-Store only sells 3 units this month.] S-Stores sales revenue for a month is
calculated as follows:
Sales revenue = 7 ECU * Number of units sold.
Your job is to manage the stores inventory levels by each month choosing an inventory order.
Prior to the start of each month you can order coffee makers from the supplier to add to the
inventory. Your inventory management determines the S-Stores total costs. S-Store pays two
types of costs. One is the ordering cost. Every time you order a positive amount you have
to pay an order cost. This ordering cost is 45 ECU, and does not depend upon the size of
the order. If you order zero coffee makers then you do not pay the 45 ECU ordering cost.
Holding coffee makers in inventory is costly so S-Store pays a monthly inventory holding
cost. S-Store pays monthly inventory holding cost is based on the average number of coffee
makers held in inventory multiplied by the per unit monthly inventory holding cost of 1 ECU.
This is calculated as follows:
Inventory holding costs = 1 ECU * (Opening inventory + Order Quantity + Closing
inventory)/2.
Calculation of S-Stores profits
Profits = Sales revenue - Ordering costs - Inventory holding costs
Your monthly earnings are equal to S-Stores monthly profits.
Examples:
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1. Alices closing inventory of last month is 20 units, she placed an order of 0 units in this
month.
The demand for each month is 10 units.
She made sales of 10 units.
Her closing inventory of this month is 20− 10 = 10 units.
Her profit in this month is equal to: 7 ∗ 10− 0− 1 ∗ (20 + 0 + 10)/2 = 55.
2. Alices closing inventory of last month is 4 units, she placed an order of 5 units in this
month.
The demand for each month is 10 units.
She only made sales of 9 units. Her closing inventory of this month is 0 units. Her profit
in this month is equal to: 7 ∗ 9− 45− 1 ∗ (4 + 5 + 0)/2 = 13.5.
A.3 Multiple Choice Questions prior to Decision Task
There are a couple of questions for you before the task, please use the information:
The demand for each month is 10 units.
Price of each coffee maker is 7.
Ordering cost is 45 per order.
Monthly inventory holding cost is 1 per unit.
Question 1 of 7
If the inventory level was 5 and you ordered 0 units. How many units will you SELL this month?
A 0
B 5
C 10
D 15
Question 2 of 7
If the inventory level was 0 and you ordered 15 units. How many units will you SELL this
month?
A 0
B 5
C 10
D 15
Question 3 of 7
If you made sales of 10 units. What will be your SALES REVENUE this month?
A 0
B 10
C 25
D 70
Question 4 of 7
If you ordered 0 units. What will be your ORDERING COST this month?
A 0
B 1
C 45
D 70
Question 5 of 7
If you ordered 1 unit. What will be your ORDERING COST this month?
A 0
B 1
C 45
30
D 70
Question 6 of 7
If the inventory level was 0 and you ordered 10 units. You made sales of 10 units. What will
be your HOLDING COST this month?
A 0
B 1
C 5
D 10
Question 7 of 7
If your sales revenue is 70. Your ordering cost is 0 and your holding cost is 10. What will be
your PROFIT this month?
A 15
B 25
C 60
D 70
Figure 7 shows the result page of the multiple choice questions when participants had given more
than 2 incorrect answers. Under such circumstances, they had to raise their hands to go through
incorrectly answered questions with a monitor in order to obtain a passcode to proceed to the
decision tasks.
Figure 7: Result Page of the Multiple Choice Questions
A.4 Decision Tasks
Prior to each year’s decision tasks, a mini-instruction page appears. Figure 8 is an example
with PIN task. For treatments with high cognitive loads, the pin page follows (Figure 9).
An example of the ordering decision page is shown in Figure 10. Participants move the slider
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Figure 8: An example of Instruction Page with PIN task
Figure 9: PIN Page prior to Ordering Page
to enter their decision of order quantity for each month. Order quantities, costs, and profits of
previous months are also displayed on the page. If participants completed the year’s decision
task within 4 minutes, they had to wait until the end of 4 minutes.
They were then prompted to enter the PIN (Figure 11), followed by the end of the year result
page (Figure 12).
B Post-Experimental Survey, Demographics and Summary Statis-
tics of Participants
Participants were asked to fill a simple questionnaire at the end of the experiment for us to
collect some demographic information.
The following are some summary statistics of the participants.
Table 11: Demographics in Participants
Age (mean) 25.6
Gender (% female) 65%
Education (%Undergraduate) 51%
One can observe that 37% of the participants are from Social Science & Management, among
which they may have training in operations management or have been exposed to the EOQ
model before.
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Figure 10: Ordering Page
Figure 11: Enter the PIN Page
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Figure 12: End of the Year Result Page
Figure 13: Post-Experimental Survey
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Figure 14: Distribution of University Programs Participants study and Mathematics levels of
participants (self reported)
24%
19%
13%
6.4%
37%
Arts & Humanities Engineering & Technology
Life Sciences & Medicine Natural Sciences
Social Sciences & Management
University Faculty of Participants
(a) Distribution of University Programs Participants
study
24%
24%
20%
27%
1.9%3.2%
A Levels GCSE
Postgraduate Undergraduate
above Postgraduate below GCSE
Mathematics Level of Participants
(b) Mathematics levels of participants
Table 12: Regression on PIN and demographic information
(1) (2)
Annual Profit Annual Profit
Year 1 -129.08∗∗∗ -130.78∗∗∗
(19.30) (18.84)
Year 2 -71.18∗∗∗ -70.65∗∗∗
(16.84) (16.90)
Year 3 -31.00∗∗ -30.90∗∗
(13.76) (13.23)
Year 4 -13.95 -13.74
(12.28) (11.89)
Unrestricted -22.32∗∗ -33.26∗∗∗
(11.22) (12.56)
High·Correct PIN 27.26∗ 19.09
(15.96) (16.13)
Age -2.42∗∗∗
(0.78)
Male 16.14
(11.88)
Postgrad -7.44
(12.40)
STEM 8.66
(13.73)
Math level -5.98
(5.20)
Constant 417.18∗∗∗ 505.75∗∗∗
(15.61) (33.00)
N 385 385
R2 0.18 0.22
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C Possible NW NB sets by month
Table 13: The No worse than and No better than sets for each EOQ cycle by month
Months 2-8
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {1, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2, 3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {3} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {1, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 9
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2, 3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {3} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {3, 4} NB = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 10
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2, 3} NB = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {3} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {2, 3, 4} NB = {1, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {1, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 11
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1, 2, 3} NB = {1, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {2} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {2, 3} NB = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4} NB = {4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
Month 12
s˜i,k−1 = 1 NW = {1} NB = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 2 NW = {1, 2} NB = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 3 NW = {1, 2, 3} NB = {3, 4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 4 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4} NB = {4, 5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 5 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} NB = {5, 6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 6 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} NB = {6, 12}
s˜i,k−1 = 12 NW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12} NB = {12}
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